Passage Summary: Some people say something is real if it's part of a great scientific theory, but the author thinks this is wrong because theories often include 'made-up' parts just to make the logic work.

Conclusion: The approach of defining real objects as only those entities found in the most powerful scientific theories is incorrect.

Reasoning: Scientific theories often include entities that are included solely for theoretical consistency rather than because they have been observed.

Analysis: The author is rejecting a definition of 'reality' because it includes things that are 'only theoretical.' To justify this move, we need a principle that says theoretical existence isn't enough to count as being 'real.' The logical gap exists between an entity being 'posited on theoretical grounds' and it being 'not real.' Look for a rule that explicitly states that if something is only there to make a theory function, it should not be considered a real, physical entity. We are looking for a principle that validates the author's dismissal of theoretical placeholders.